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The paper studies the contribution of human capital on economic growth through its impact on the 
rate of innovation by formulating an endogenous growth model that combines elements from Romer (1990), 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), and van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). Using a relatively broad concept of human 
capital that includes not only formal education but also on-the-job training, the article addresses two main 
issues. The first one is the optimum provision of firm-specific training necessary to be able to adopt and 
adapt to new technologies. The second one is the impact of both formal education and on-the-job training on 
the innovative capacity of an economic system that is the ultimate cause of output growth. In our set-up, 
general education enhances R&D activities and lowers adjustment costs to new technologies, thus 
facilitating their adoption, while on the other hand learning and firm-specific training ensure the possibility 
to implement the new coming technologies and reap all the related future profits.  
  In the first part we assume that the adoption of a new technology consists of two periods, i.e. the 
learning phase during which newly hired workers acquire the right amount of know how in order to become 
familiar with the specific new technology, and a production phase in which profit flows arise for firms and 
in which the cost savings can be realized that arise from productivity increases in the learning phase. By 
expanding the training phase, entrepreneurs run a greater risk of shortening the production phase for a 
given arrival rate of new technologies that progressively erode the profit flows obtained from existing 
technologies.  
  The paper shows first that it is possible to find an optimum, endogenously determined, amount of 
firm-specific training, that depends  on the individuals’ speed in skills acquisition and educational 
attainment. Thus, a situation in which better educated workers may be disproportionately selected for 
training issues is possible, especially in times of rapid technological change. However, the paper also shows 
that an increase in the formal level of education can even result in a reduction of growth because of the 
increase in ‘technology absorption costs’ in terms of output foregone during re-training spells that arrive at  
a faster rate. In addition, the paper shows how to calculate the optimum endogenous taxation rate in order 
to cover the educational expenditures while ensuring the maximum growth rate of innovations. The results  
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The purpose of the paper is to study the contribution of human capital to 
economic growth through its impact on the rate of innovation, by formulating an 
endogenous growth model that combines elements from Romer (1990), Aghion and 
Howitt (1998) and van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). We use a relatively broad concept of 
human capital that includes both formal education and on-the-job training1. The model 
takes the endogeneity of firms’ training decisions into account and addresses two main 
issues. The first issue concerns the optimum provision of firm-specific training necessary 
to be able to adopt and adapt to new technologies. The second issue concerns the impact 
of formal education and on-the-job training on the innovative capacity of an economic 
system that is the ultimate cause of output growth. In our set-up, general education and 
specific training fulfil two different functions: general education increases the 
opportunities for future research and development and lowers adjustment costs to new 
technologies, thus facilitating their adoption, while firm-specific training ensures the 
profitable adoption of the new technologies.  
Our setting links the labour economics literature on education and training and 
the endogenous growth literature on human capital formation as the primary cause of 
productivity growth. So far, training, and especially its interaction with formal 
education, has been largely ignored in the growth literature, except as contributing 
factors in growth accounting exercises à la Denison (1967).  The reason why we have 
chosen to pursue this combination of different strands of literature is that, since the 
1980’s, massive shifts have occurred in skill requirements in the workforce as a result of 
skill biased technical change (Acemoglu, 1996, 2002; Lopez-Bassols, 2002; Bartel et al., 
2003). This emphasizes at least the practical importance, if not the fundamental 
importance,  of the availability of skills through education and training fro economic 
growth. While low-skilled blue collar persons lost many of their employment 
opportunities, those for the high-skilled white collar persons increased (Colecchia and 
Papaconstantinou, 1996). This shift has also been present before the 1980’s (Autor et al. 
1998), even though it was less readily apparent then. As Breshnahan et al. (2002, p. 339) 
state: “The shift toward more skilled workers appears to have accelerated in the last 25 years 
relative to 1940-1973, especially over the period 1980 until the mid-1990s. Over this period, 
demand has strongly shifted from low-and middle-wage occupations and skills toward highly 
rewarded jobs and tasks, those requiring exceptional talent, training, autonomy, or management 
ability. The overall effect has been both large and widespread, substantially shifting relative wages 
in the top, middle, and bottom of the income distribution.” 
In addition to these facts about changes in the skill-structure of demand, growth 
theory too has recognised human capital accumulation, or more generally knowledge 
accumulation, as the ultimate source of growth, and changes in its stock to determine the 
                                                 
1 We implicitly assume formal education to be publicly-funded while on-the-job training to be 
privately-funded by firms.    3
rate of growth. In particular, new growth theory links growth performance to 
endogenously driven technical change which, in turn, may be brought about by a 
variety of reasons: learning by doing, external effects of human capital formation, 
production externalities of public expenditures and quality improvements through the 
invention of new products. And contrary to the basic neo-classical model where 
innovation occurs as if it is a public good, in the new growth theories it is the (partial) 
non excludability of technical knowledge that is responsible for the cumulative character 
of knowledge accumulation, and thus for the long term sustainability of growth. In new 
growth theory, the importance of education in promoting economic growth is reaffirmed 
and the externalities associated with education are given prime importance: long run 
economic growth increases as a result of an increase in the rate of technological change 
and the latter increases when there are more highly educated workers around.  
 
 
1.1. Human capital theory 
 
 
Currently two important frameworks in the human capital theory can be 
distinguished: the Nelson and Phelps approach and the Lucas approach (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998).  The first of the two goes back to Nelson and Phelps (1966) and, recently, 
has been revived by the new Schumpeterian growth literature. In this class of models the 
basic idea is that growth is primarily driven by the stock of human capital that in turn 
affects a country’s ability to innovate or to catch up with more advanced countries. 
Differences in growth rates across countries are then attributable to differences in 
human capital stocks and thereby in those countries’ abilities to generate new ideas and 
technical progress. Nelson and Phelps argue that a major role of education is to increase 
the individual’s capacity, first, to innovate and, second, to adapt to new technologies, 
thereby speeding up technological diffusion and progress. This approach to education is 
closely linked with the process of technological change and gives rise to some interesting 
results. First, productivity growth and the rate of innovations should increase with the 
level of education; second, the marginal productivity of education attainment is an 
increasing function of the rate of technological progress; third, educational attainment 
and R&D are complementary activities, so that government subsidies to education will 
increase the profitability of research and development activities, thereby speeding up 
technological progress; fourth,   education should allow less developed countries to 
learn more from advanced countries and then achieve a higher degree of productivity 
improvement when innovating.  
  The Lucas approach, instead, mainly studies the significance of human capital 
accumulation  to economic growth. Based on the contributions of Becker (1964) and 
Uzawa (1965), the main idea of this model is that growth is driven by the accumulation of 
human capital, so that differences in growth rates across countries are mainly due to 
differences in the rates at which those countries accumulate human capital over time. In 
this view the human capital stock is considered as an ordinary input, like labour and   4
capital. In the long run, sustained growth is only possible if human capital can grow 
without bound. In particular, the assumption that human capital accumulation involves 
constant returns to the existing stock of human capital produces a positive steady state 
growth rate. The way in which Lucas endogenises growth, implies that the more time 
people spent in education, the faster they will grow more productive as workers in final 
output production, thus effectively linking formal education and on the job productivity 
growth. 
  So far, the empirical literature does not seem to provide an unambiguous answer 
on which of the two interpretations regarding the nature of schooling is better. Work by 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) suggests that accepting 
one approach does not necessarily lead to rejecting the other.  
  
 
1.2. The role of education in R&D-based endogenous growth models  
 
 
Endogenous growth models based on the analysis of knowledge accumulation 
through research and development lead to the contribution of Romer (1990): here the 
steady-state growth rate partly depends on the number of skilled workers, that is the 
level of human capital. The basic idea is that knowledge is used in innovation, just as in 
the model developed by Nelson and Phelps, and human capital is likely to be a key 
input in the production of new ideas. In contrast with the Lucas perspective, this opens 
up the possibility that even a one-off increase in the stock of human capital will raise the 
growth rate indefinitely (Temple, 2000). However, in most R&D-based endogenous 
growth models, the stock of human capital is taken as exogenous. More recent works, 
notably Acemoglu (1997) and Redding (1996) have relaxed this hypothesis and have 
considered what happens when individuals can choose to make investments in 
education or training and firms can choose to make investments in research in an 
interdependent way. As the authors show, this setting generates the possibility of ‘low-
skill, low-quality traps’ in which low skills and slow rates of innovation reflect a 
coordination failure. These models suggest that, at the aggregate level, greater 
investments in education or training might raise expenditure in R&D, and vice versa.  
  Another interesting aspect of recent growth models concerns the idea that 
individuals can under-invest in education. This topic is well examined by Rustichini and 
Schmitz (1991), who present a model in which people divide their time between 
production and research and the acquisition of knowledge through education. Each 
individual knows that acquiring knowledge will raise his productivity in subsequent 
research, but due to the fact that they are not able to reap all the benefits of research, 
they will tend to spend too little time at school relative to the socially optimal outcome.  
  In summary, the endogenous growth models outlined above are important for 
several reasons. First, they consider human capital as a crucial factor in the creation of 
new ideas, so that education plays a pivotal role in determining economic growth, 
certainly over longer periods of time. Second, they sometimes yield the result that a   5
laissez-faire outcome may deliver slower growth than is socially optimal. Third, the 
models suggest that policy makers who wish to raise the level of welfare have different 
options: not just subsidies to R&D, but also subsidies to certain kinds of education. 
Indeed, these models offer a justification for including educational policies in their 
economic policy portfolios.  
 
 
1.3. Schumpeterian growth and the destruction of knowledge 
 
  
  The positive link between R&D and economic growth, however, has to some 
extent been questioned by the new Schumpeterian growth literature that focused the 
attention on the process of profit erosion coming from a high rate of technological 
change. Even if the contributions in this field are numerous, we will continue to refer to 
the basic setup provided by Aghion and Howitt (1992). In their model, growth is 
generated by a stochastic sequence of quality improving innovations that result from 
uncertain research activities. The main characteristic of vertical innovation is that new 
inventions make old technologies or products obsolete. This obsolescence, also called 
‘creative destruction’, implies a negative relationship between current and future 
research, which results in the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium and also in 
the possibility of cyclical growth patterns. The model leads to the conclusion that if the 
rate of technological progress in plants is very fast, then plants will have a short lifetime 
and hence the proportion of workers released every period will be high. The rapid flow 
of workers into unemployment will generate a high steady-state unemployment rate.  
Faster productivity growth also has another negative effect.  As stated by Aghion 
and Howitt (1998, p. 143): ‘The faster rate of plant obsolescence also reduces the payout period 
to a firm’s investment in plants. By discouraging the creation of the new plants that are the 
source of new job opening, it thus tends to reduce the job-finding rate in the economy, leading to 
a higher steady-state unemployment rate. We call this effect indirect creative destruction’. More 
recently, Eicher and Kim (1999), introducing heterogeneous technologies, production 
costs and market shares into the conventional product variety models, and making both 
skills and technology endogenous, provide a mechanism by which increases in the share 
of skilled workers in R&D do not automatically result in higher rates of growth, that is a 
key counterfactual in R&D-based growth models. In contrast, they suggest that the 
response of the growth rate to a higher share of labour in R&D depends on the level of 
development of an economic system.  
The main criticism arising in this paper is the same as that of Temple (2000) and 
Scicchitano (2004): endogenous growth models, and especially the ones based on the 
complementarity between research and human capital, do not seem to take sufficiently 
into account the heterogeneous nature of human capital, in particular the role that 
technology specific on-the-job training might have in affecting the innovative capacity of 
an economic system.    6
  It is against this background of the heterogeneity of technologies that the neo-
Schumpeterian growth models seems to provide a relatively straight-forward 
framework that would enable us to find out more about the reasons why on-the-job 
training is important and what the nature of its relationship with formal education and 
economic growth looks like. The way to do this is to take into account the implications of 




1.4. The distinction between general education and specific training 
 
 
This lack of interest in the heterogeneity of technology and skill-requirements 
pointed out in the previous paragraph, is also surprising given the fact that the literature 
on labour economics since the 1960s has often stressed the importance of activities like 
training, learning by doing, experience and so on in the process of human capital 
accumulation, both at the individual level and at the firm level. For, as early as 1962, 
Mincer wrote in his first paper about on-the-job training: “In the context of the economist’s 
concern with education as a process of investment in manpower, it is important to be reminded 
that formal school instruction is neither an exclusive nor a sufficient method of training the 
labour force. Graduation from some level of schooling does not signify the completion of a 
training process. It is usually the end of a more general and preparatory stage, and the beginning 
of a more specialized and often prolonged process of acquisition of occupational skills, after entry 
in the labour force. This second stage, training on the job, ranges from formally organized 
activities such as apprenticeships and other training programs to informal processes of learning 
from experience.” Thirty years later, Chapman (1993) states that the economic analysis of 
training and the theoretical underpinnings of training policies have received relatively 
little attention from economists considering their importance in the economy. 
According to Acemoglu (1996, p. 446),  “training is important when new technologies 
are adopted, or in the process of a radical change in the environment, for example the shift from 
low to high skill jobs taking place in most OECD countries today.” The major theoretical 
development in this field comes with the distinction between training which is relevant  
for a wide range of tasks and across all firms compared to training which is more 
specific to the job and firm. Becker (1975) defines as general the training activity which 
increases the marginal productivity of trainees by exactly the same amount in the firms 
providing the training as in the other firms. At the same time he defines as specific the 
training that has no effects on the productivity of trainees that would be useful to other 
firms2.  
                                                 
2 More recent work includes that of Acemoglu (1996) who provides a theory of training in  the 
presence of imperfectly competitive labour markets, whereas still more recently Mori (2003) 
states that the traditional distinction between general and specific training is artificial, because in 
equilibrium there should be an equal distribution of marginal benefits and costs of these different   7
The importance of the distinction between schooling and specific training has 
been highlighted in three interesting research studies3. The first was carried out in 1979 
and concerned workers in Germany (Pischke, 2001), while the second and the third4, 
concerned Canadian workers in 1989 and 1993, respectively. The main conclusions we 
can reach from these studies are that, first, the most common channel through which 
manufacturing workers obtain the most important skills for the labour market is 
continuous formal on-the-job training. Second, the most important place where they 
received the most useful skills for the labour market is the firm, the workplace, the 
second being school and higher education institutions. Going more in detail, among the 
firms that do not use innovative technology, 77% adopt training; among those carrying 
out just one innovative technology, the percentage of firms which train their workers 
increase to 90%; almost all firms (99%) which use 5 or more technologies are forced to 
adopt training; among the firms which innovate by adopting existent technologies, the 
fraction of those which adopt specific training is 55%; on the contrary, among those 
which innovate by creating new technologies, 79% are forced to adopt specific training.  
  There is also empirical evidence showing that the overall amount of training that 
workers are taking is increasing (Mincer, 1962; Chapman, 1993; OECD, 1998). Data on 
OECD countries show, in particular, that investments in on-the-job training are a very 
large component of total investment in education in the US economy while in all 
reported countries, with one exception, at least 1 in 5 employees have participated in 
some job-related continuing education and training within a 12-month period.  
 
 
1.5. The link between education and training 
 
 
While there is ample empirical evidence that the distinction between education 
and specific training are important in shaping and improving individuals’ skills 
endowments, the logical next question is whether these types of training are really 
substitutes or complements. The positive links discussed above between training and 
technical change on the one hand and education and technical change on the other, 
implies such a positive correlation also for education and training. But a direct, albeit 
partial, answer to this question also comes from Mincer (1962), who recognizes that the 
degree of substitutability between the two varies among jobs and over time with 
changes of technology. However, he also admits that a positive association between 
education and training is not definitional but is an empirical inference from the observed 
income data. More schooling, in fact, seems to involve more training, both formal and 
informal, though not necessarily in a fixed proportion. School education, indeed, is a 
                                                                                                                                                   
types of training. In addition, human capital accumulation in both cases is regulated by the same 
contracts, promotion systems and lifetime employment incentives.  
3 These studies are described in Scicchitano (2004).  
4 In particular we are referring to the Survey of Manufacturing Technology (1989) and the Survey of 
Innovation and Advanced Technology (1993).    8
prerequisite, a basis on which to build additional, more specialized, training. Due to the 
difficulty collecting data at the firm and the individual level, the empirical evidence is 
a m b i g u o u s .  W h a t  w e  d o  k n o w  f r o m  d a t a  i s  t h a t  a  p o s i t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
education and job training can and has been inferred from differential slopes of 
experience profiles of wages (Mincer 1974, 1988a, 1988b).  
The positive association between education and on-the-job training helps to 
understand trends. It suggests that an expansion of education is likely to bring about an 
expansion of training itself. To the extent that the expansion of education is induced by a 
decrease in its price relative to the price of training, some substitution will take place, 
and education may grow at the expense of work-based learning. In addition to this, the 
data suggest slow or no growth of training at the lower educational levels and 
pronounced growth at upper educational levels. This finding supports popular 
impressions about the changing levels of on-the-job training: a shift from 
apprenticeships to technicians, scientific personnel, and executive development 
programs. Such shifts may, in the aggregate, reflect an upward trend in supplies of 
labour with high levels of educational attainment and possibly some substitution 
phenomena at the lower levels (Mincer, 1991).  
  International evidence on the complementary nature of education and training 
comes also from Brunello (2001) and OECD (2001). Adults with high levels of 
educational attainment are also more likely to receive more training. On average, 3 times 
as many job-related training hours are invested in adults with a tertiary qualification 
compared to those with less than an upper-secondary qualification. Moreover, training 
tends to reinforce skill differences resulting from an unequal participation in initial 
education. Participation rates in both job-related continuing education and training and 
in all continuing education and training rise with levels of educational attainment. Bartel 
and Lichtenberg (1987) and Lillard and Tan (1986) show that the positive association 
between initial education and participation in continuing education and training 
remains strong even after controlling for other characteristics affecting participation in 
training. Workers tend to receive more training in countries with higher overall average 
levels of educational attainment, as well as in countries that devote a larger share of 
GDP to research and development, or that achieve a strong trade performance in “high-
tech” industries. These patterns suggest that initial education and continuing education 
and training are mutually reinforcing, and that education combines with other factors to 
make adult training least common among those who need it most. Still other empirical 
support for the complementary nature of education and training comes from Heijke et al. 
(2003), who find a positive correlation between the level of generic competencies 
acquired through tertiary education and training participation of young workers. In 
addition, the amount of on-the-job training needed is positively related to the actual 
vocational competencies mismatches, as training is needed to adjust the acquired 
competencies to the required ones.  
  Human capital theory offers a general answer to why higher-educated workers 
engage in more training on the job: persons that have greater learning ability and better 
opportunities to finance the costs of human capital investments, do indeed invest more   9
in all forms of human capital, including schooling and job training (Mincer, 1991). 
Moreover, some analysts claim that school education is a complementary factor to job 
training in producing human capital: this is in line with the idea that generic 
competencies acquired in higher education reduce the costs of further learning by 
providing higher learning abilities for graduates. In other words, education enhances the 
productivity of job training at work. It is clear, however, that schooling can also be a 
substitute for job training: thus, the decline in apprenticeship has been attributed to 
growth in educational levels over the long-run. Finally, both school education and job 
training are more profitable where productivity growth is more rapid.  
 
 
1.6. The link between technical change and education and training 
 
 
Empirical facts about the link between technical change and education and training 
can be inferred from multi-factor or total factor productivity growth exercises. The main 
findings are the following:  
 
1.  a more rapid pace of technology in a sector generates an increased demand for 
education and training of the sectoral workforce (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987; 
Mincer, 1991); 
2.  more-educated workers are utilized the younger the age of equipment, and this 
effect is magnified in R&D-intensive industries (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987); 
3.  there is greater prevalence of job training in sectors in which (Jorgenson) 
measures of productivity growth are higher (Lillard and Tan, 1986). Bresnahan et 
al. (2002) also find that ICT measures, in particular ICT and workplace 
organization, are correlated with policies for greater investments in human 
capital, i.e. training and screening of new employees on the basis of their 
education;  
4.  over the long run, technologically more progressive industries tend to utilize 
more-educated workers among the younger workers (Gill, 1988; Bresnahan et al. , 
2002; Lopez-Bassols, 2002);  
5.  training activities are more frequent when productivity growth is faster, 
although faster technological change does not necessarily require the duration of 
training to be longer (Mincer, 1984, 1991);5  
6.  the bias of technological change toward human capital means that in the short 
run, wages of more-educated workers increase more or are reduced less in 
sectors with more-rapid productivity growth (Mincer, 1991). Thus, wage profiles 
are steeper in progressive sectors as profitability of training and experience 
increases (Muysken and Ruholl, 2001).  
                                                 
5 For reasons of simplicity, we will not allow for varying intensities of training per unit of time n 
our model, however.   10
 
Summarising the points above, education and training are in higher demand where 
productivity growth is more rapid because the technological changes in production 
processes that underlie productivity growth, require the training and retraining of 
workers. Faster technical change requires a faster replacement of skills that become 
obsolete. This requires more training on the one hand (cf. points 1, 3 and 5), and/or a 
greater ability to train (i.e. a higher level of education as suggested by points 1, 2, 4 and 
6). In fact, if skills acquired in training become obsolete relatively rapidly, the incentives 
for workers to invest in learning activities would be reduced unless employers would 
cover the training costs. On the other hand, if obsolescence is gradual or partial, 
successive training or retraining would add to skills, and incentives would not be 
impaired, especially if employers share the training costs. On the firm’s side, Bartel 
(1995) finds that training has a positive and significant effect on both wages growth and 
workers’ productivity, but its return on the employer’s investment usually diminishes as 
skills depreciation rate increases. Although the threat of even partial knowledge 
obsolescence may deter workers from investing in training, firms must persist in 
technological adaptation to remain competitive, while (but also by) employing a 
workforce with complementary and changing skills. According to Mincer (1991), if 
technological adaptation or changes are in some degree firm-specific, the firm will tend 
to train its workers after initially hiring more-adaptable and educated people who, in 




1.7 Roundup and overview basic modelling principles 
 
 
Rounding up, there are five important relations between education, training and 
growth that we can extract from the theoretical and empirical studies referred to above: 
  
1.  The positive link between productivity on the one hand, and training and 
education on the other; 
2.  The positive link between high levels of education and R&D; 
3.  The positive link between high levels of R&D and growth;  
4.  The nature of the trade-off between education and training; 
5.  The nature of the link between high levels of growth (through technical 
change) and training, i.e. the relative increase in importance of education as a 
source of growth relative to training in times of fast technical change. 
 
The first three relations we consider to be ‘stylised facts’ comparable in nature to 
logical premises. We will include them in our model as such. Relations 4 and 5 we 
consider to be relations that should logically follow from the premises 1 to 3 - and other   11
ones usual in endogenous growth modelling-, and that should then be confronted with 
the results regarding 4 and 5 discussed above.  
We use these relations as the basis for the construction of an endogenous growth 
model that supports our belief that human capital has a positive impact on growth. At 
the same time we think that schooling as a proxy for human capital endowment is not 
sufficient to describe the process through which workers and firms cope with 
innovations and rapid technological change. We feel that general education is important 
for making people more ‘flexible’ in learning specific skills, while on-the-job training is 
essential in order to reduce the vocational mismatches (Heijke et al., 2003) that new 
products, new processes and new organizational practices create. In our setting it is 
technical and organizational progress that opens the possibility to have a mismatch 
between the competencies embodied in individuals through schooling and the 
competencies that firms require in their production processes. Technological change 
generates new jobs that, in turn, require new and more complex skills: these 
competencies are not completely developed in formal schooling, but they can only be 
learnt and experienced on the job, thus reducing time per worker that can effectively be 
allocated to the actual production process. Therefore, in the model we develop, the 
investments in formal education are made by individuals and institutions, while 
investments in on-the-job training are exclusively and entirely made by firms. Thus, the 
firm faces a trade-off: by spending resources and time in educating its workforce on the 
job, the firm builds its ‘knowledge-base’, that, in turn, will be necessary in order to cope 
with new technologies coming from R&D activities. At the same time, while a firm is 
spending time out to learn about the new production process associated with new 
technologies/products. By doing that, it also runs the risk that a new technology will 
come on-line making the vocational competencies just acquired by the workforce rapidly 
obsolete (Gould et al., 2003).  
We apply this broad modelling principle through a direct implementation of   
links 1-3 listed above, by considering both formal schooling and on-the-job training as 
the main channels through which individuals acquire generic  and  field-specific – or 
technology-specific - competencies. Since  it is not possible to provide a precise definition 
of training because it spans too many boundaries (Chapman, 1993), we will follow 
Heijke et al. (2003) in assuming that human capital endowments of individuals are a 
combination of vocational competencies of a particular field of studies and generic 
competencies. The former includes field-specific theoretical knowledge and field-specific 
knowledge of methods, while the latter includes learning abilities, reflective thinking, 
problem-solving abilities, analytical competencies, documenting ideas and information. 
The theoretical and empirical literature has stressed the importance of both kinds of 
knowledge, depending on the industrial context and on the model of industrial 
capitalism considered (Antonelli, 1994; Booth and Snower, 1996; Green et al., 2000).  
  One of the main assumptions of the model is that the effectiveness by which 
more-educated workers are able to adjust or improve their competencies and their 
labour productivity is determined by the level of skills acquired in initial education. A 
higher level of education is therefore useful in three ways: first, it is the basis for future   12
R&D; second, it positively affects individual labour productivity; third, it allows taking 
part in training with a higher productivity since higher-educated individuals learn more 
quickly and are therefore less costly to (re-) train. This assumption is consistent with 
premise 1 above. By modelling the productivity of a worker as a geometric average of 
his level of education and training, we will effectively be treating these two channels as 
direct substitutes at the micro-level. We will then look at the association between 
education and training at the macro-level to find out whether we can reproduce stylised 
fact number 4, that is somewhat ambiguous in that most material seems to point to a 
positive, and then complementary, link between education and training, while some 
material points to a negative link between education and training, and hence education 
and training would have to be substitutes, not only at the micro-level, but also at the 
macro-level. Premises 2 and 3 are covered by using the Romer (1990) model as a 
template for our own exercise. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a 
description of the model, including sensitivity analyses that we have performed to show 
how training and education depend on each other in the framework of intertemporal 
profit maximisation. After all, the benefits from training take the form of reductions in 
future production costs. We also show how the integration of this training behaviour in 
a general equilibrium growth setting influences the growth results. Because the model is 
strongly non-linear, we use numerical simulation to show how it works, and what kind 
of conclusions can be reached regarding the growth, education and training nexus. 
Section 3 provides a summary and some concluding remarks. 
  
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. Basic model set-up 
 
  The model combines elements from various endogenous growth models, 
especially the one by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). It also uses insights 
from similar modelling exercises in van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). In order to keep the 
model as simple as possible, we only have two types of labour as factors of production. 
The one type of labour is low-skilled6 that only has a use in producing output, and high-
skilled labour that has an alternative use in the form of designing blueprints for new 
production technologies. There is no capital, so no saving decision needs to be made.  
The model starts from the assumption that the introduction of new technologies 
requires the users of these new technologies to learn how to use them effectively and 
efficiently. In order to do that, the workforce associated with a new technology needs to 
be trained first.7 During their training period, the workers earn a competitive wage, since 
                                                 
6 The ‘eye-hand coordination’ of Romer (1990).  
7 This implies that the know-how of workers with respect to using other technologies is not readily 
applicable to new technologies. Hence all workers that are assigned to a job need to learn how to 
perform effectively in that job.   13
they are assumed to be indifferent between working (and so ‘earning their keep’) and 
training (thus learning to ‘earn their keep’ later on). During the training period, workers 
that are trained are not working. Hence they do not produce anything. Therefore, the 
costs of training include both the direct costs of wages that have to be offered to the 
trainees and the opportunity costs of not producing anything while training. The 
benefits from training are an increased productivity later on during the production 
phase of a technology. This increase in productivity enables the owners of the firms that 
use new technologies to economise on wage-costs during the production phase. Training 
therefore generates cost-reductions in the future in return for current cost-increases. 
  Because we assume that there is no production while training, it follows 
immediately that a model with complete creative destruction of old technologies 
through the arrival of new technologies is less suited for our purposes, since it would 
generate ‘odd’ growth patterns that can not be observed in reality. For, in such a creative 
destruction setting, the arrival of a new superior technology would lead to a zero level of 
output, while the workforce is re-trained to be used with the new technology. Instead, a 
Romer (1990) like approach seems to be more suited, since in that case new technologies 
do not fully replace old ones, but gradually drive them out of the market. This is the 
‘creative wear and tear effect’ referred to in van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). In such a 
Romerian ‘love of variety’ set-up, old technologies never die, but simply become less 
important and therefore less used with the progress of time. This creative ‘wear and tear’ 
continuously and gradually releases labour resources that can be re-employed by the 
new firms created with the aim of using the new technologies that arrive on the market.  
  While labour productivity can be increased directly by training, the productivity 
of the training process is positively influenced by the level of formal education attained 
by the workforce during the first part of their lives. In addition, we assume that the 
productivity of researchers is positively influenced by the level of skills they have 
accumulated through formal schooling8. This set-up suggests that we may expect an 
interesting result to arise from a framework like this, in which creative ‘wear and tear’ 
that is induced by faster technological change - i.e. a faster arrival of new technologies 
on the market - will lead to shorter payback periods for the training costs involved in 
absorbing those new technologies. This suggests that faster technological change due to 
a higher educated population also induces a shift in emphasis from specific training 
towards more general education. The reason is that a better educated workforce would 
be more able to adapt to faster changing production circumstances as they would arise 
from a faster arrival of new technologies. In short, one would expect there to be a 
premium on formal education rather than specific training in times of rapid 
technological change. Furthermore, one would expect that an increase in the formal level 
of education could even result in a reduction of growth because of the increase in 
                                                 
8 The first assumption is in line with many real life observations. See for instance Bartel (1995), 
Linder (1998),  OECD (1998). The second assumption, instead, goes back to the intuition of Romer 
(1990) and is supported by international data on R&D outcomes. We implicitly assume that no 
on-the-job training occurs for R&D workers, since it is supposed to be somehow included in 
formal advanced educational programs, like master degrees, PhDs, stages and so on.    14
‘technology absorption costs’ in terms of output foregone during re-training spells that 
arrive at a faster rate, but may take a shorter time. This suggests that from growth 
perspective at least, there may be an optimum level of formal education which would 
seem to be a result that is very useful from an education policy perspective.   
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we first pay 
some attention to the different kinds of labour and their supply. Then in section 2.3 we 
describe the demand for labour from a micro-perspective as part of our training and 
production model. In section 2.4 we show how the outcomes regarding optimum 
training durations and quasi-rents depend on the structural parameters of the model. 
Section 2.5 describes the aggregate demand for production labour, while section 2.6 
describes the demand for R&D labour. In section 2.7 all the parts of the model are 
integrated, and since it has become a highly non-linear model, we use numerical 
simulations to show the main relationships between education, training and economic 
growth at the aggregate level. 
 
 
2.2 Labour supply 
 
  
  There are two types of labour, low-skilled labour (further called L), and high-
skilled labour (further called H). L is used in final output production only, while H is 
used as R&D labour (further called HR) and high-skilled production labour (further 
called HP). 
  For reasons of simplicity we will not formulate a fully-fledged overlapping 
generations model. However, the ‘story’ behind our model is one where the population 
itself remains fixed, but constantly needs education, as one would expect it to occur in 
real life too due to the fact that older (educated) generations die, and the youngest are 
born with a clean educational slate. We will model this by assuming that at any time just 
a fraction  1 ) 1 ( 0 ≤ − ≤ ϕ of the high-skilled population is available for final output 
production and R&D activities, whereas the complement of that fraction, i.e. ϕ , is being 
e d u c a t e d .  T o  s i m p l i f y  t h i n g s  e v e n  f u r t h e r ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  L does not need any 
education.9 Given the above, we must have that the entire population P  is given by: 
 
H L P + =            ( 1 )  
 
where H  is the part of the population that is suitable to fill high-skilled jobs in final 
output production and in research activities. From the exposition above, it follows 
immediately that: 
 
P R H H H + = − ). 1 ( ϕ           ( 2 )  
                                                 
9 This is a strong assumption, but it reflects the notion that high-skilled workers generally have 
been educated for far longer periods than low-skilled workers (OECD, 2001).    15
 
  Equation (2) states that the part of the high-skilled population that is not in the 
educational system is either engaged in R&D activities (HR) or in final output production 
activities (HP), while HP itself is in part engaged in training (T) and in production (J):  
 
J T HP + =            ( 3 )  
 
  Equations (2) and (3) state that markets are always assumed to clear, since there 
is no unemployment pool that absorbs excess supply. Equation (2) also indicates that 
educated high-skilled R&D labour is a perfect substitute for high-skilled production 
labour, and the other way around. 
 
 
2.3 Labour demand 
 
2.3.1 The demand for intermediates 
  
The demand for labour is derived from the assumption that output is produced 
under perfectly competitive circumstances, by assembling the intermediate outputs of a 
set of imperfectly substitutable production technologies using low-skilled labour only. 
We use an Ethier function, as in Romer (1990) to describe this final output production 
process: 
 
di x L Y
B
i ∫ ⋅ =
−
0
1 α α           ( 4 )  
 
In equation (4), Y is final output, B is the index of the latest technology that has 
entered the production phase, and xi is the volume of intermediate output associated 
with production technology i.  ) 1 ( α −  is the partial output elasticity of low-skilled 
labour. 
  For reasons of simplicity, we assume that one unit of each intermediate good 
requires the use of one efficiency unit of high-skilled labour. Efficiency units of labour 
used in the production of xi are called hi.  We therefore have: 
 
B i x h i i ≤ ≤ ∀ = 0          ( 5 )  
 
We furthermore assume that one physical unit of high-skilled labour associated 
with technology i (further called ji) can generate  ) , ( ϕ π s  efficiency units of labour. 
) , ( ϕ π s  is therefore the productivity of labour, and s measures the length of time spent 
training by this worker, while ϕ  is a direct indicator of the time spent in formal 
education. Obviously, we assume  0 / , 0 / > ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ ϕ π π s . We therefore have: 
   16
B i s x s h j i i i ≤ ≤ ∀ = = 0 ) , ( / ) , ( / ϕ π ϕ π        ( 6 )  
 
The demand for each intermediate, given its price pi, can be obtained from the 




σ α α α α
− − ⋅ = ⇔ ⋅ ⋅ = ∂ ∂ = / /
1
i i i i i p L x x L x Y p       ( 7 )  
 
where  1 ) 1 /( 1 > − = α σ .  
The corresponding demand for labour in physical units can immediately be 
obtained by substituting (5) and (6) into (7): 
 
() ) , ( / / ϕ π α
σ s p L j i i
− ⋅ =          ( 8 )  
 
Equation (8) represents the derived demand for labour for each intermediate 
goods producing firm, given the price it sets for its intermediate.  
 
 
2.3.2 Maximising the net present value of expected quasi-rents 
 
 
The price setting behaviour referred to above, together with the behaviour that 
determines how long the training period s should be, can be formulated as the solution 
to the problem of maximising the net present value of the flow of quasi-rents that can be 
obtained by hiring a population of workers, training them for s time-units, and then 
using these trained workers to generate output that is sold conditional on the inverse 
demand curve (7) and its expected evolution over time. For, as we will show later on, in 
a situation of steady state growth, wages may be expected to grow equally steadily, and 
so prices (being set using a mark-up over marginal costs) can be expected to grow 
(steadily) too. 
  Because of the symmetry between firms - all firms have the same production 
technologies and contribute in the same way to final output -, the training period s will 
be the same for all (relatively) new firms too. Hence, wages are the same for each firm 
too. We assume furthermore that wages offered to trainees are the same as those for 
high-skilled workers associated with firms that are in their production phase already. 
The structure outlined above has been depicted in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, the demand for labour to produce an intermediate invented at time 
t=0 is depicted for all moments in time after t = 0, for a given (and constant) growth rate 
of the wage rate. An intermediate comes onto the market after a training phase of 
duration s. During that phase, the wage rate is assumed to rise at a given proportional 
rate, and consequently (see equation (8) and (10) further below) the demand for labour 
at time t that is associated with the intermediate invented at time t = 0 , i.e. jt , will fall.   17
  However, it would be a waste of resources to train more workers than would 
actually be needed from the start of the production phase at time s, hence a rational 
entrepreneur would hire js workers during the training phase of the intermediate and 






  Figure 1 is formalised as follows. Because of the symmetry between firms, the 
training period s will be the same for all (relatively) new firms too. Hence, wages are the 
same for each firm too. Assuming furthermore that wages offered to trainees are the 
same as those for high-skilled workers associated with firms that are in their production 
phase already, the net present value of the expected flow of quasi-rents (further called 
Q) for a firm that has bought the latest blueprint at the current time (taken to be time 
zero), is given by: 
 
τ τ ϕ π
τ ρ τ ρ d w e j d s x w x p e Q T
s




⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ =
0
)} , ( / . {        ( 9 )  
 
where  ρ  is the rate of discount, and wT is the expected wage rate per physical unit of 
labour at time T.10 In equation (9), where we have used (6) to replace high-skilled labour 
demand by the demand for intermediates, the first integral describes the flow of quasi-
rents, since labour is the only factor of production. That flow starts only after the 
training-phase has ended and the production-phase has begun. The training-phase takes 
s units of time. During the training-phase, js physical units of labour need to be trained, 
since that is the amount of labour needed when the production-phase starts. There are 
                                                 
10 Note that we have dropped the technology subscripts, because the symmetry of (4) and (5) 
implies that the net present value problem is essentially the same for all intermediate goods 
producers. 
     js
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training costs involved, and the present value of these costs is given by the second 
integral in (9). The intermediate goods producer now has two independent controls to be 
determined. The first one is the Q - maximising price of intermediates, and the second 
one is the Q - maximising length of the training period s. It should be noted that 
equation (9) can be maximised with respect to the price of intermediates only for the 
future in as far as it refers to the production phase.11 By differentiating (9) with respect to 
pT for T ≥ s, we immediately obtain: 
 
)) , ( /( 0
) , (
1 1 / ϕ π α
ϕ π
ε s w p
s p
w
x p Q T T
T
T















− ⋅ + ⋅ = ∂ ∂    (10) 
 
which is the familiar Amoroso-Robinson price-setting rule, where  ) 1 /( 1 α σ ε − − = − =  
is the price-elasticity of the demand for intermediates (see (7)) and where marginal costs 
are wage costs per efficiency unit of labour.12  
  In order to find the Q - maximising value of s, we have to use Leibniz’s rule for 





































⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ −
)] , ( / . [
)}. , ( / . { 0 /
0    (11) 
 
The first term of (11) within curly brackets is the present value of the loss in 
quasi-rents that occurs by extending the training-phase by 1 unit of time. The second 
term is the present value of the additional training costs for a given number of trainees, 
while the third term is the present value of the increase in total training costs for a 
change in the number of required trainees that could be expected to occur if the 
production phase starts 1 unit of time later (i.e. if the training-phase is extended by 1 
unit of time).13 The final term represents the present value of the benefits from extra 
training, since these would increase labour productivity and hence decrease production 
costs for the entire duration of the production phase. 
                                                 
11 The price of a good that is not produced and therefore not sold can hardly be regarded as an 
effective control. 
12 Cf. Aghion and Howitt (1992), for a similar result. 
13 Indeed, as we will show later on, technical change leads to a continuous upward pressure on 
wages, and hence to a continuous downward adjustment of the demand for labour. So, by 
extending the training period, one would normally n e e d  l e s s  p e o p l e  t o  t r a i n  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
anticipated fall in the demand for labour per technology over time in the steady state.   19
In order to find the optimum length of the training phase, it is necessary to 
specify ) , ( ϕ π s . In order to accommodate the stylised fact that the higher one’s level of 
education the faster one learns, we have chosen the following specification: 
 
1 1 1
0 ) , (
γ γ ϕ γ ϕ π
− ⋅ ⋅ = s s            ( 1 2 )  
       
where  0 γ  and  1 γ  are positive and constant parameters and where  1 1 ≤ γ . From equation 
(12) it is clear that some training and education are always necessary, since otherwise 
productivity would be zero. One observes that the productivity level of a worker is a 
Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the worker’s educational level, as proxied byϕ , but also the 
level of training as proxied by s, where  1 γ  is the relative weight of training in 
productivity, and  0 γ  is a constant scale parameter14. Equation (12) shows that a constant 
level of productivity of a worker can be attained for different combinations of s and ϕ , 
where a decreasing value of s must be compensated by an ever increasing value of ϕ  in 
order to keep productivity constant, due to the concavity of the Cobb-Douglas function 




2.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
By substituting (10) and (12) into (11), we obtain the equation that can be used to 
find the optimum value of s. Unfortunately, that equation is strongly non-linear which 
precludes finding a closed form solution for s. However, we can get an impression of the 
sensitivity of the net present value of the quasi-rents, i.e. Q, for changes in s by drawing 
Q as a function of s, for given values of the parameters. These ‘base-run’ parameter 
values are given in Table 1 further below.  It should be noted that the equation derived 
above contains (endogenous) variables that are given from the point of view of the 
individual entrepreneur, but that will change endogenously over time in the full model 
that we will specify later on. Presently, we are only concerned with showing that the 
specifications we have chosen for the production structure and the productivity function 
ensure that there is indeed an optimum amount of on the job training that depends in an 
intuitive way on the parameters listed in the Table below. It should be noted, that these 
                                                 
14 We can interpret as a proxy of workers’ natural ability, I.Q. or family background, while as the speed of 
skills acquisition (like in Aghion and Howitt, 1998) or as the productivity of learning. This specification 
finds a correspondence in the empirical literature based on skills evaluation. In particular, equation (12) is 
consistent with the so called learning function (Green et al., 2000; Antonelli and Nosvelli, 2002) that is a 
knowledge production function that identifies the determinants of skills and competencies linked to a 
particular job. It estimates the impact of both formal education and work-based learning on individuals’ 
professional skills.    20
parameter values are just some ‘fake’ numbers not reflecting any empirical regularities, 





Parameter Value Parameter Value 
α   0.500  w ˆ   0.025 
ρ   0.075 
0 γ   0.100 
1 γ   0.100  ϕ   0.250 
x   1.000 
0 w   1.000 
L 1.000 δ   0.500 
 
Table 1 Base-run parameter values 
 
 
In this Table w ˆ  is the expected instantaneous growth rate of wages, whereas ρ  
is the rate of discount.15  x  is a scale factor for the demand for intermediates that will be 
modelled explicitly later on. For our present illustrative purposes the only thing that is 
relevant is that it is a constant. δ  is the intrinsic productivity of R&D workers, which 
will be made more clear later on. 
In Figure 2, the downwards sloping curve is the one associated with  s Q ∂ ∂ / . 
One observes that for the specific parameter set chosen here, Q itself has a maximum, 
but Q is relatively irresponsive to changes in s in the neighbourhood of that maximum. 
The maximum of Q is reached for a value of s about equal to 0.53. 
 















                                                 
15 Obviously, in the full simultaneous model, the expected growth rate will be an endogenous 
variable.   21
By changing the parameters underlying Q, we can find out more about the 
qualitative and quantitative behaviour of Q and the consequences for the optimum 
value of s. In order to do this, we have increased each of the parameters individually by 
10 percent as compared to its base-run value, and then obtained the corresponding 
graph of Q. The shifts in the graph of Q are a direct indication then of the partial 
derivatives of Q with respect to the parameter under consideration for the entire range 
of values of s. But rather than showing all the graphs associated with these partial 
derivatives, we provide information in tabular form below in Table 2. The first column 
of that Table holds the names of the parameters we have changed, while holding the 
other parameters constant. The columns labelled Q and s hold information regarding the 





-curve) with respect to the parameter under consideration. 
 
 
Parameter  Q s  Parameter  Q s 
α   - -  1 γ   + + 
w ˆ   - -  ϕ   + + 
ρ   - - x   + + 
0 γ   + +  w0  - - 
 
Table 2. Parameter sensitivity 
 
 
From Table 2 we can conclude that the signs of the changes in Q and s are always 
the same. This indicates that, roughly speaking, a variation in some parameter changes 
the shape of the Q-curve roughly proportional in all directions measured from the 
origin. Hence, if the Q-curve expands, its top also moves away from the origin, and vice 
versa. Looking at the effects of individual parameter changes, we see that an increase in 
α  implies an increase of the price-elasticity of demand. This in turn lowers the profit 
margin, hence profits themselves, hence the present value of the quasi-rents Q too. This 
will lower the optimum amount of training, as one would expect, ceteris paribus. An 
increase in the rate of discount  ρ  has qualitatively the same effects. The present value of 
the quasi-rents is negatively affected, and so is the optimum amount of training. A rise 
in the productivity parameter  0 γ  raises both the present value of the quasi-rent and the 
value of the optimum amount of training, again as expected. A change in  1 γ  raises the 
contribution of training to productivity. It also reduces the contribution of education to 
productivity. The net effect on the present value of the quasi-rents is positive but very 
small, while the effect on the optimum amount of training is distinctly positive. A 
change in the amount of formal education ϕ  has a positive effect on productivity, hence 
on  Q. It also raises the optimum amount of training, indicating that the optimizing 
behaviour underlying the choice of the amount of training turns education and training   22
into complements from an observational point of view16 rather than the substitutes that 
they formally are, given the specification of the productivity function we have chosen 
(cf. (12)). A change in the growth rate of wages reduces Q. It also reduces the optimum 
amount of training, since not only training costs rise during the training phase, but in 
addition quasi-rents during the production phase fall. Similar results can be observed for 
a rise in the initial wage rate. Both Q and the optimum amount of training fall, because 
profit flows are negatively affected, as with the rise in the expected growth rate of 
wages. Moreover, the payback period is reduced, thus putting a bonus on starting the 
production phase earlier than with lower initial wages. Finally, a rise in the autonomous 
demand for the intermediate under consideration would raise both Q and the optimum 
amount of training, as one would expect. 
  We conclude that the sensitivity results are all plausible, but more importantly, 
the profit maximising behaviour underlying the decision how long to train the workforce turns 
education and training into observational complements, even though they enter the productivity 
function given by (12) as direct substitutes. 
 
 
2.5 Technical change and the demand for labour at the aggregate level 
 
  
  As in the Romer (1990) model, a new intermediate input is produced in 
accordance with the newest blueprint coming from the R&D sector. The index of the 
newest blueprint produced at time t is A(t), and R&D workers produce these blueprints 
at a proportional rate that is itself proportional to the number of R&D workers, as in 
Romer (1990). We therefore have: 
 
A H dt dA R A . . / δ =           ( 1 3 )  
 
  Assuming steady state growth in A at a rate A ˆ , it must be the case that the latest 
intermediate that is actually in the production phase must be the intermediate that has 
just ended the training phase of length s. Let B(t) be the blueprint index of the marginal 
intermediate just entering the production phase at time t. In that case we must have that: 
 
  ) ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( s A Exp t A s t A t B ⋅ − ⋅ = − =         ( 1 4 )  
 
  Because of the symmetry of (4) with respect to each intermediate, we must 
furthermore have that the demand for labour active in the production phase is the same 
for each intermediate. Hence, the demand for all labour in the production phase must be 
given by: 
 
                                                 
16 This holds under the ceteris paribus assumption. Things will change somewhat in the context of 
the full model, as we will see later on.   23
   ( )
σ σ α α ϕ π
2 ) , ( / ) ( ) . ˆ ( ). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ =
−
s t w L s A Exp t A t j t B t J      (15) 
 
where  ) (t j  is the common number of production workers active on each intermediate 
with index less than or equal to B(t), and where we have substituted (14) and (8). 
  Because of technical change, i.e. growth in A(t), we find that the (15) states that 
the demand for labour would grow as fast as A(t) itself, ceteris paribus. For a given level 
of supply of production labour, this implies that the wage rate is driven up to maintain 
equilibrium between the demand for production labour and the given supply of 
production labour. In fact, taking logarithmic time derivatives of (15), while assuming 
J(t) to be constant, we find that the steady state/equilibrium growth rate of wages is 
equal to: 
 
σ / ˆ ˆ A w =            ( 1 6 )  
 
  This positive growth in wages implies that the demand for labour would drop 
both for intermediates in the production phase, but more importantly, also for labour in 
the training phase, since we did assume that the workers engaged in technology specific 
training must be offered a competitive wage, i.e. the same wage as that of workers in the 
production phase. But if the wage rate is expected to rise during the training phase 
because  A(t) grows, then the cost-efficient amount o f  l a b o u r  t o  h i r e  f o r  t h e  n e w e s t  
intermediate with index A(t) at time t would be  ) ( s t j + , since that is exactly the amount 
of production labour that will need to become active after the training phase on 
intermediate with index A(t) has passed. Something similar goes for all intermediates in 
the training phase, i.e. for all intermediates with an index i such that B(t)<=i<=A(t).  
Let  ) (i τ  be the moment in time when the intermediate with index i was invented. 
Then, in a situation of steady state growth, and assuming A(0)=1, we must have that: 
 
A i Log i i A Exp i ˆ / ) ( ) ( )) ( . ˆ ( = ⇔ = τ τ         ( 1 7 )  
 
Furthermore, the demand for labour during the training phase would be equal to 
the number of workers that would be optimal at the time the production phase of 
intermediate i commences. This amount of labour for intermediate i is given by: 
 
()
σ σ α α ϕ π τ τ
2 ) , ( / ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ⋅ + ⋅ = +
−
s s i w L s i j      ( 1 8 )  
 
where  ) ) ( ( s i w + τ  is the expected wage rate at the time intermediate i  enters its 
production phase. For a given and constant growth rate of wages, we can write: 
 
)) 1 .( ˆ ( ). ( ) 1 ( t t w Exp t w t w − =          ( 1 9 )  
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  Substituting (17) and (19) into (18), we immediately find the demand for labour 
for intermediate i that is in the training phase at time t: 
 
) ˆ / )) / ( ( ˆ ( ) ) , ( / ) ( .( ) ) ( (
2 A A i Log s w Exp s t w L s i j + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = +
− σ α ϕ π τ
σ σ α    (20) 
 
  We see from (20) that the demand for labour during the training phase depends 
negatively on the duration of the training period s. It also depends negatively on the 
time of arrival of an intermediate: the younger it is, the longer the period during which 
training will have to take place, and the lower will be the corresponding demand for 
labour. Given (19), total demand for labour associated with all intermediates in the 
training phase can be obtained through integration over all intermediates in the training 
phase: 
  
) ˆ ˆ /( ) 1 )) ˆ ˆ ( ( ).( ˆ (
ˆ . 2 ) ( ) , ( ) (
) (
) (
) ) ( ( ) (
w A w A s Exp A Exp
A t w s L t A
t A
t B
dz s z j t T
⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ −
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∫ = + =
σ σ σ
σ α σ ασ ϕ π τ
   (21) 
 
  In fact, given (16), equation (21) is ill defined, and we need to use l’Hopital’s rule 
to find its limiting value in the steady state, since both the numerator and the 
denominator would go to zero in that case. Application of l’Hopital’s rule results in: 
 
() A s s t w L s A Exp t A t T ˆ ) , ( / ) ( ) . ˆ ( ). ( ) (
2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − =
− σ σ α α ϕ π      ( 2 2 )  
 
Then, using (22) and (15), we find that: 
  
) ˆ /( 1 ) ( / ) ( A s t T t J ⋅ =           ( 2 3 )  
 
which makes perfect sense: the number of workers in the production phase relative to 
the number of workers in the training phase falls if the duration of the training period 
increases, while it also falls in case the rate of technical change increases. The latter is 
easy to understand, since the share of the number of intermediates in the training phase 
must increase if  A ˆ  increases.17 Consequently, more people will receive training in times 
of faster technical change. 
  We can now obtain the total demand for production labour both in the 
production phase and the training phase by adding (15) and (22) together. Then, using 
(3), we can invert this relation to get the equilibrium wage rate that would clear the 
market for total production labour both in the training and the production phase: 
                                                 
17 This share is equal to  ) ˆ ( 1 / 1 / ) ( s A Exp A B A B A ⋅ − − = − = − . For positive s, this share increases if 
A ˆ  increases.   25
 
σ σ α ασ ϕ π / 1 )} ˆ 1 ( 2 ) , ( ) . ˆ ( ). ( 1 ) {( ) ( s A s L s A Exp t A P H t w ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − =    (24) 
 
  We see that in the steady state the growth rate of wages would still be given by 
(16). We also see that an increase in the availability of production labour would depress 
wages, as one would expect. Much further than this we can not go, since s itself, but also 
A ˆ  (see section 2.5 below), depends (non-linearly) on wages and wage growth.   
However, in section 3 we will use (24) as part of a system of simultaneous relations to 
find out about the connection between education, training, production and growth at the 




2.6 The demand for R&D labour 
 
 
We slightly amend the R&D production function that Romer (1990) has used, in 
that we take into account the productivity effects of education on the direct productivity 
of high skilled R&D workers. In fact, we assume that this productivity effect is equally 
strong in production and in R&D activities. So we include the term 
1 1 γ ϕ
−  as we did in 
the productivity equation given by (12). We therefore have: 
 
1 1 ˆ γ φ δ
− ⋅ ⋅ = R H A           ( 2 5 )  
 
  Assuming, as Romer does, that the present value of the (expected) quasi-rents 
can be captured by the blueprint producers, and that R&D wages equal the marginal 
benefits from hiring an additional R&D worker, we find that: 
 
1 1 ). / (
γ ϕ δ
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
∂




R        ( 2 6 )  
 
  Substituting (9) for Q as well as (10) for all the intermediates that are in the 
production phase18, we find a complicated expression for the wage rate for R&D workers 
that depends on the wage rate of production workers. When we substitute (24) into that 
expression, we can find out the value of HP as a function of all the variables and 
parameters of the model, for which wages for the high-skilled earned in both their uses 
(as R&D workers and as production workers) are equal. Because of the possibility of 
labour market arbitrage, the latter is an equilibrium condition. Hence, we get: 
 
                                                 
18 We assume that there is no output, hence no sales, on intermediates during the training phase.   26
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A A s Exp A
A A s A A s Exp
P H  (27) 
 
  This equation is hard to interpret, certainly since we still need to substitute for  A ˆ  
using (25) but also for s, and subsequently equation (2) to obtain the final solution for HP. 
Indeed, substituting (2) into (25), we get: 
 
1 1
) ). 1 (( ˆ γ
φ δ ϕ
−
⋅ ⋅ − − = P H H A         ( 2 8 )  
 
The simultaneous solution to (27) and (28) is highly non-linear, while moreover it 
doesn’t have a closed form. This then forces us to investigate the properties of our model 
in a numerical/graphical way. This is done in section 2.7. 
 
 
2.7 The full model: model simulations 
 
  The simultaneous model that we are going to solve numerically19 for the 
variables  T J H H A s R P , , , , ˆ ,  consists of the following equations: 
 
1.  equation (16) that describes the link between technical change and wage growth; 
2.  equation  (27) that describes the equilibrium level of production labour demand; 
3.  equation  (28) that describes the rate of technical change in function of the level of 
production labour; 
4.  equation (23) that describes the ratio of production labour in the production 
phase relative to production labour in the training phase; 
5.  equation (2) that describes the constraint on the use of high-skilled labour as 
R&D workers and production workers; 
6.  equation (3) that describes the requirement that each production worker must 
either be producing or be training at any point in time. 
 
We now put the productivity parameter associated with the R&D production 
function (28), i.e. δ , equal to 0.5 and then solve the simultaneous model for varying 
values of ϕ , i.e. the level of education of high-skilled workers proxied by the duration of 
formal education, whereas the other parameters still have the values shown in Table 1, 
except for the growth in wages that is now linked to the rate of technical change through 
equation (16), and  x , that is given by the parameter combination 
σ α ⋅ = L x  (cf. equation 
(7)).  The way in which the equilibrium steady state growth rate  A ˆ  depends on the 
amount of education, can now readily be observed from solving the simultaneous 
system outlined above, for all values  1 0 ≤ ≤ϕ . The result is presented in Figure 3. In this 
                                                 
19 We do this using the Mathematica package.   27
Figure, we find two curves with an ‘inverted’ U-shape. The solid curve is the one 
associated with a value of  5 . 0 = δ , whereas the dotted curve is associated with a value of 
6 . 0 = δ . 
  



















Figure 3       Figure 4 
 
The vertical axis of Figure 3 is associated with the growth rate of A, indicated by 
GA. Looking at this Figure, there are two main conclusions to be drawn. First of all, the 
rate of technical change depends positively on the value of the productivity 
parameterδ , since the dotted curve lies entirely above the solid curve. Secondly, from a 
growth perspective, there seems to be an optimum value of the level of education, since 
the growth curve reaches a definite maximum for  43 . 0 ≈ ϕ . The reason why the curve 
has an inverted U-shape is somewhat trivial: if one spends all his/her time at school, one 
doesn’t produce much in the end. And if one spends no time at all at school, one doesn’t 
get smart enough to produce much. This follows immediately from (28).  
We have also plotted the corresponding graphs for the duration of training s, as 
shown in Figure 4. This graph shows that for low levels of education, an increase in the 
level of education will be associated with a lower level of training, suggesting that 
training and education act like substitutes. For high levels of education, however, the 
amount of training rises with the level of education, suggesting that education and 
training are complements. This result is consistent with the mixed results one has found 
regarding the complementarity/substitutability of training and education in function of 
the level of education referred to in the introduction. However, we still have to explain 
the downward sloping part of the curves, since our partial sensitivity results on the link 
between the duration of training and education was positive. One should recall that on 
the downward sloping part of the curve, the rate of technical change is rising (see Figure 
3), and therefore also the growth rate of wages (cf. equation (16)). Table 2, that contains 
our partial sensitivity results, shows that an increase in the growth rate of wages reduces 
the optimum amount of training, because profit flows are strongly eroded. On the 
downward sloping part of the training duration curves above, the rise in the growth rate 
of wages causes training levels to fall by more than the optimum amount of training 
expands with an increase in the level of education. When the rate of technical change   28
starts falling again after ϕ  starts exceeding its growth maximising value, the growth rate 
of the wage rate is reduced as well, and the partial complementarity results become 
stronger again, resulting in the observed positive correlation between education and 
training for higher levels of education. Interestingly, this downward shift of the training 
duration curve signals that in times of strong technical change, general education becomes a 
relatively more important determinant of productivity than technology specific training, since for 
every level of general education, the optimum level of training falls. 
  In Figure 5, we see that the optimum amount of active production labour steadily 
falls when ϕ  increases. Moreover, the optimum number of active production workers 
falls with an increase in the productivity of R&D workers. Figure 6, shows how the 
number of R&D workers changes with the level of education. Again, this is as expected. 
At first the number of R&D workers rises for an increase in the level of education, and 
then it falls when the reduction in available hours per R&D worker falls below the 
increase in the absolute productivity of that worker. Since the direct impact of education 
on R&D productivity is subject to diminishing returns, the hours-reduction effect will 
start to outweigh the positive productivity effect for values of the levels of education 
above  ) 2 /( ) 1 ( 1 1 γ γ ϕ − − = .  
 


















Figure 5      Figure 6 
 


















Figure 7      Figure 8 
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In Figure 7, we show what happens to the number of workers in the production 
phase J. We see that the number of these workers steadily falls with an increase inϕ , 
pretty much as what happened to HP (see Figure 5). This is only logical, since the share 
production workers in the training phase is just a few percent of the total number of 
production workers. In Figure 8, we depict what happens to the number of workers in 
the training phase. The results in Figure 8 are very interesting on two accounts. First, an 
increase in the productivity of R&D workers raises the number of production workers in 
the training phase. This is consistent with the idea that increased technical progress 
brings about stronger creative wear and tear of technology specific knowledge, requiring 
more people to be retrained. Secondly, the number of people in the training phase peaks 
at levels of education that are somewhat lower than in the low productivity/growth case. 
This is due to the fact that the strong upward pressure on wage growth for low but 
growing levels of education have a strongly negative effect on the duration of training 
(see Figure 4) that leads to a fall in the number of people in the training phase even 
before the peak in the rate of technical change itself has been reached. 
  
 
2.8 Introducing a proportional output tax to finance education 
 
 
So far we have looked at the properties of the model for changing levels of 
education, without considering the resources that would go into increasing the level of 
education. In this section we will introduce a tax on output meant to finance the cost of 
general education, to see whether or not the inverse U-shaped growth curve will 
survive. For reasons of simplicity, we take final output as the resource in question. In 
addition to this, we assume that total resources used are proportional both to total 
educational efforts, proxied by  H ⋅ ϕ , and to the real wage rate. This implies that real 
relative prices, including the price of labour, output and educational resources are 
constant in the steady state. The constant factor of proportion is  µ , which we will put 
equal to 1, for reasons of simplicity and without  loss of generality. The tax rate on 
output that would provide the necessary educational resources would therefore be given 
by: 
 
Y H w H w Y / ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⇒ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ϕ µ τ ϕ µ τ        ( 2 9 )  
 
  It should be noted that this specification of the tax rate implies that it will be 
constant in the steady state, since output will grow at the rate  σ α / ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( A A = ⋅ −  (cf. 
equation (4)), just like the real wage rate (cf. equation (16)). 
  B(t) is the number of intermediates at time t that actually produce output and so 
generate real national product Y. Hence, the symmetry between intermediates allows us 
to write actual output at time t as: 
   30
()
ασ ασ α α α α ϕ π
2 1 ) , ( / ) / .( ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ =
− − s w L B B J B L Y       ( 3 0 )  
 
where we have used equations (4), (8) and (10). By substituting the equilibrium wage 
rate as given by (24), as well as equation (14) into (30), we obtain: 
 
α α α α σ
− − − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ = ) ˆ 1 ( . ) ( ) / ˆ (
1 1 A s L H A s Exp A Y P     ( 3 1 )  
 
  Substitution of equation (30) into (29) allows us to write ϕ  as a function of the tax 
rate  τ  and all the other model variables including the wage rate. By substituting (24) 
and (12) into that result, we can get rid of the wage rate again and find that the tax rate 
that is necessary to finance a certain level of education is given by: 
 
P H
A s s H
) 1 ( 1
0
2 1 1 ) ˆ 1 (
γ α α αγ ϕ γ α
τ
− ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
=        ( 3 2 )  
 
  We see from (32) that the tax rate rises with the level of education but also with 
the number of people receiving education. It is inversely proportional to the number of 
workers that are active in the production phase.20 It also rises with the duration of the 
training phase. We can then invert (32) to obtain the level of education ϕ  that can be 
achieved for a given tax rateτ . Hence, the model can in principle be restated in terms of 
this tax rate rather than in terms of the level of education as the independent variable.  
The question then becomes whether there is a tax rate that would maximise 
growth, given the model so far extended with (32).21 In order to obtain the answer to this 
question, it is instructive to notice that in the steady state equation (31) implies that 
output will evolve in accordance with: 
 
) ) / ˆ (( 0 t A Exp Y Y ⋅ ⋅ = σ             ( 3 3 )  
 
  Since there is no investment, all output not used as resources in education will be 
consumed. As stated above, in the steady state the tax rate will have to be a constant, so 
the CIES intertemporal utility function can be written as: 
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20  This number is equal to  ) ˆ 1 /( A s H J P ⋅ + = . This follows directly from equation (23). 
21 Actually, we have good reasons to expect that there will be, since HP depended negatively on 
the level of education, implying that the relation between the tax rate and the level of education 
will be positive, but for the impact of education through the growth rate of A, which should be 
relatively small for reasonable values of the latter growth rate.   31
where  0 Ψ  represents the ‘present value of the steady state’ (or PVSS for short). In order 
to ensure that utility depends negatively on the rate of discount ρ , we have to assume 
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger than 1, i.e.  1 / 1 > θ . In this case, 
utility also depends positively on the rate of technical change A ˆ . In order for the utility 
integral to converge, we have also required that )) 1 ( ) 1 /(( ˆ α θ ρ − ⋅ − < A . For values of 
1 , 0 < < θ α , this will certainly be the case if  ρ < A ˆ , which does not seem to be a very 
strong requirement.  
Assuming a value of  5 . 0 = θ  and Y0 = 122, we can rewrite the model in terms of the 
tax rate τ  as independent variable by replacing every instance of ϕ  by the 
corresponding value of τ  implied by (32). In addition, we can add equation (34) to the 
model to see whether or not there is an optimum tax rate. Without re-drawing all the 
Figures shown above for the model including taxes, we can state that the inclusion of the 
output tax does not change the qualitative results of the model at all. Indeed, the present 
value of the steady state has a definite maximum that is reached for a tax rate equal to 
0.048, as can be seen from Figure 9 below. Figure 10 shows the corresponding results for 
the rate of technical change, which peaks at a slightly higher value of the tax rate (0.061) 
than the present value of the steady state.  
 
 
















Figure 9      Figure 10 
 
 
These results imply that growth maximization is not the same as welfare 
maximization. This in turn resembles the modified golden rule of accumulation in the 
standard neo-classical growth model, also for pretty much the same reasons: since future 
consumption is discounted, current consumption levels have a higher relative weight in 
the present value of the steady state than consumption in the future. This leads to a bias 
towards present consumption by choosing a lower tax rate and hence lower education 
levels and therefore lower growth. 
                                                 
22 Y0 and P just scale the PVSS, whereas the tax rate has a direct impact on PVSS and an indirect 
one through the growth rate of A.    32
The main conclusion we may draw, however, is that the inclusion of the use of 
resources in education that have to be financed out of output, does not change the 
qualitative results we have shown in Figures 3 - 8 above: at a ‘technical’ level, education 
and training are direct substitutes, while the intertemporal nature of the training 
decision turns them into observational complements. Inclusion of this endogenous 
training decision in a general equilibrium endogenous growth framework turns 
education and training at the aggregate level into observational substitutes for low levels 
of education and into complements again for high levels of education. Moreover, in 
times of faster technical change, we can observe a downward shift of the training curve 
for all levels of education, thus increasing the relative importance of the contribution of 
education to growth as technology-specific training becomes less attractive through the 
increased creative wear and tear in times of high rates of innovation.  
 
 
3. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
  In this paper we have presented a simple model that integrates training decisions 
at the micro-level with education decisions at the macro-level in an endogenous growth 
setting. This endogenous growth model is constructed to explain the observed link 
between training, education and technical change through the incorporation of a 
number of stylised facts regarding training, education and productivity. These facts are: 
1) productivity is positively affected by both the level of training and education; 2) R&D 
activity requires the input of highly educated workers; 3) there is a positive link between 
R&D activity and the rate of endogenous economic growth. Based on these stylised facts, 
we want to be able to investigate A) the nature of the trade-off between education and 
training, and B) the nature of link between growth performance on the one hand and the 
relative importance of general education and technology specific training on the other. 
  The training decisions referred to above are part of a set-up where new 
intermediate goods are continuously invented in a Romer-type ‘love of variety’ 
production model in which low-skilled workers use intermediates to produce final 
output in a completely standardised production process. The intermediates on the other 
hand require the input of high-skilled production labour. Because of the specialised 
character of the intermediates, these high-skilled production workers need to learn how 
to produce these new intermediate goods. In order to do that, they first enter a training 
phase before entering the production phase. During the training phase, production 
workers do not produce anything, or they produce a so little amount of output that can 
be supposed to be closed to zero. This presents an intertemporal trade-off to the 
employers of the trainees. For, the training process itself increases the productivity of the 
trainees, so that cost-savings in the future can be realised. In the meantime, employers 
will have to offer a competitive wage to the trainees, since the latter have the option of   33
working in firms that are already in the production phase23. We show that when 
employers are maximising the stream of quasi-rents associated with producing 
intermediate goods, there is an optimum duration of training.  
With respect to the productivity increase through training, we assume that that is 
positively affected by the level of education of a trainee: a high level of education makes 
it relatively easy to absorb new, technology-specific, knowledge. This is consistent with 
the stylised facts. So, from a productivity point of view, the level of education and the 
amount of training are assumed to be direct substitutes. Still, we find that if the level of 
education increases the optimum amount of training increases as well, which is 
consistent with most of the empirical evidence presented in the introduction of the 
paper. This observational complementarity comes from the fact that for a rise in the level 
of education, a corresponding rise in the level of training requires relatively little extra 
costs, whereas the period during which the resulting cost savings can be realised can be 
relatively long. This result confirms the empirical evidence that consider formal 
education and work-based learning as mutually reinforcing factors in the process of 
competence building. We show in a sensitivity analysis, that changes in the optimum 
duration of training caused by changes in the rate of discount, the price elasticity of 
demand, expected wage growth and so on, are all as one would expect intuitively. 
We then complete the general equilibrium growth model by adding an R&D 
sector very much as in Romer (1990), where we introduce the level of education as a 
factor that determines the productivity of high-skilled R&D workers in much the same 
way as that of high-skilled production workers. In addition to this, since time spent on 
education cannot be spent either as production time or R&D-time there is also a negative 
impact of the increase of the educational level on the availability of high-skilled R&D 
time. This defines an inverted U-shaped relationship between the rate of technical 
change, as captured by the rate of growth of the number of intermediates, and the level 
of education. We close the model by aggregating over all technologies to obtain 
aggregate demand being the sum of production labour for all technologies in their 
production phase and in their training phase, when applicable, and R&D labour. We 
then solve the aggregate rate of technical change, aggregate production labour demand, 
aggregate demand for labour in the training phase and aggregate R&D labour demand 
for an exogenously given level of education. We then increase the productivity 
parameter associated with the R&D process to see what a higher rate of technical change 
means for the variables under consideration. We find that this does indeed raise both the 
number of R&D workers and the rate of technical change, as expected. We also find that 
the observational complementarity between education and training turns into a U-
shaped relationship between the duration of training and the level of education, 
indicating observational substitutability for low levels of education and 
complementarity for higher levels of education. This observational substitutability arises 
from a general equilibrium effect, that pushe s  u p  w a g e s  a s  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
education raises the growth rate of the economy and hence the demand for production 
                                                 
23 See Booth and Snower (1996) for a survey on the literature on poaching externalities.    34
labour. This reduces the optimum duration of training, as was shown in the parameter 
sensitivity results. We also observe that this U-shaped curve shifts downward in the 
training and education-plane, thus changing the training and education mix in favour of 
general education in times of faster technical change. We find furthermore that the rate 
of technical change peaks for a certain level of education, indicating that there is a 
growth maximising level of education.  
We then extend the model by introducing a tax on output that is used to finance 
the resources spent on education. We find that the inverse-U shaped relationship 
between the rate of technical change and the level of education remains, and when we 
use a CIES intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function specified in terms of 
the evolution over time of net output - i.e. output less resources spent on education -, we 
find that the CIES utility integral also peaks for a certain given tax rate that is however 
slightly lower than the tax rate that would maximise the rate of technical change. This 
result is consistent with the modified golden rule in the context of the neo-classical 
growth model, where the introduction of explicit intertemporal decision making  and 
the discounting of the future calls for higher levels of present consumption and lower 
levels of growth. 
We conclude that our model, that uses standard constructs from new growth 
modelling, reproduces the mixed findings regarding the substitutability and/or 
complementarity between education and training. Our model also indicates that there is 
a socially optimal level of education (and training) that implicitly defines a socially 
optimal level of the human capital stock. Furthermore, the inverted U-shape we find for 
the relationship between the growth rate of innovations and the level of education 
confirms the results previously achieved by the neo-Schumpeterian growth literature.  
  We also find that when we include an output tax in the model to finance 
resources spent on education, the qualitative results obtained without the tax do not 
change. We do find, however, that the socially optimum growth rate - and tax rate - is 
somewhat lower than the maximum growth rate.  
Finally, our model shows that in times of increasing technical change, the 
optimum (portfolio-) mix between education and training changes in favour of general 
education, since that provides a relatively solid basis for the development of technology- 
specific skills that are prone to creative destruction.    35
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